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Article 
Weighing Lives: Israel’s Prisoner-Exchange Policy 
and the Right to Life 
Shelly Aviv Yeini 
Abstract 
The state of Israel has engaged in many prisoner-exchange 
deals involving large numbers of released prisoners in exchange 
for only a few Israeli captives. The Jibril Agreement and the 
Shalit prisoner exchange has set the price tag of one Israeli 
captive to the equivalent of several hundreds of prisoners. 
Israel’s prisoner-exchange policy is suggested to contribute to a 
cycle whereby more lives are lost, which raises many important 
questions with regard to the right to life. Such a high price tag 
on Israeli life encourages more kidnappings, which results in 
further prisoner exchanges—and so forth. It is also claimed that 
released prisoners sometimes resume their involvement in 
terrorism, which causes a further loss of lives. 
This study aims to understand the motivations of Israel to 
engage in such unbalanced prisoner exchanges, to analyze 
Israel’s prisoner-exchange policy with reference to various 
aspects of the right to life, and finally, to offer guidelines and 
improvements to the current policy to better address the right to 
life principles. 
INTRODUCTION 
This research examines the right to life implications of 
different aspects of Israel’s prisoner-exchange policy. The 
intention is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of such 
policy and to offer guidelines that bring the prisoner-exchange 
practice more in line with right to life principles. 
 
  Shelly Aviv Yeini is a Ph.D. Candidate at Bar-Ilan University, Faculty 
of Law. I thank Professor Christof Heyns for his valuable ideas and comments. 
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Over the years Israel has engaged in many unbalanced 
prisoner-exchange deals with its Arab neighbors, involving large 
numbers of released prisoners in exchange for only a few Israeli 
captives.1 In the first years after the formation of the state of 
Israel in 1948, such exchanges were usually performed in the 
aftermath of a war where both negotiating parties were states. 
Over time the conflicts in which Israel was involved changed 
from state-based warfare to guerrilla-based warfare. In this 
context a model of “extortion” exchange has developed, with 
“terrorist organizations holding Israeli soldiers and civilians 
hostage, with their release conditional on the release of 
hundreds of imprisoned members of these organizations.”2 
Israel has always preferred to free Israeli captives by force 
but has consistently paid a steep price for the release of its 
captives when this option is unavailable.3 As of the late 1960s 
terrorist organizations have adopted a pattern of “hit and run,” 
taking Israeli hostages to areas beyond the reach of Israel’s 
security services in demand of the release of prisoners.4 It is 
estimated that in total Israel has released about 7,500 prisoners 
in exchange for fourteen living captives and the bodies of six 
soldiers.5 
Notable incidents followed by exchange deals include the 
hijacking of the TWA Boeing in 1969, and the kidnappings of 
Avraham Amram in 1978, eight Nahal soldiers in 1982, Yosef 
Fink and Rachamin Alsheikh in 1986, Itamar Iliyah in 1997, 
Elhanan Tannenbaum and the Har-Dov captives in 2000, and 
Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev in 2006.6 However, the 
prisoner-exchange deals concerning Jibril and Shalit were the 
most influential and large-scale. 
 
 
 1. Off. of the IDF Spokesman, IDF’s Spokesperson’s Unit Information, 
INT’L COMM’N FOR MISSING ISRAELI SOLDIERS, http://www.mia.org.il/
idfhxheb.html (last updated July 2005). 
 2. Yoram Schweitzer, Israel: Hostage to Its Soldiers’ Captors?, in 
STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL 2010 25, 25 (Shlomo Brom & Anat Kurz eds., 
2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Draft Bill for Principles for the Redemption of Captives and Missing 
Persons, 5776–2015, HH (Knesset) No. 1847 p. 20 (Isr.). 
 6. Ariel Gilboa, The Influence of “The Cost” in Negotiations for Release of 
Captives from Terrorist Organizations 27–28 (2010) (unpublished M.P.P. 
thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), http://public-policy.huji.ac.il/.
upload/ Thesis_HE/Ariel_Gilboa_thesis.pdf. 
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The Jibril Agreement of 1985 was a watershed in the history 
of Israeli-Arab prisoner exchange. The deal was the release of 
three captured Israeli soldiers in exchange for 1,150 prisoners, 
80 of whom were said to have had “blood on their hands,” a term 
referring to prisoners convicted of murder.7 As a result, the Jibril 
deal set the “exchange rate” for following exchanges.8 
The Shalit prison exchange began on June 25, 2006 when 
Hamas, together with the Palestinian Popular Resistance 
Committees and the Jaysh al-Islam, carried out an assault on 
the Kerem Shalom border crossing in Israel, taking Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) Corporal Gilad Shalit hostage in the 
process.9 The abductors threatened, explicitly in some reports, 
to execute Shalit if their demands were not met.10 Israel’s failure 
to discover where Shalit was held captive left it with no military 
option and, consequently, no alternative but to enter into 
negotiations with Hamas. 
During more than five years of negotiations, Israel 
remained in the dark regarding the soldier’s whereabouts, and 
very little was known about his physical and mental wellbeing.11 
In October 2009 Israel released twenty female prisoners in 
return for a sign of life of Shalit.12 Eventually, in October 2011, 
Israel and Hamas struck a deal to release Shalit in exchange for 
1,027 prisoners,13 454 of whom were described to have had “blood 
on their hands.”14 
In addition to Israel’s primary objective to bring Shalit home 
unharmed, it also wanted to ensure that convicted terrorists, 
once released, would not resume terrorist activity against 
 
 7. Yoram Schweitzer, A Mixed Blessing: Hamas, Israel, and the Recent 
Prisoner Exchange, 14 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 23, 34 (Jan. 2012). 
 8. Ziv Bohrer & Mark J. Osiel, Proportionality in War, Protecting Soldiers 
from Enemy Captivity, and Israel’s Operation Cast Lead—”The Soldiers are 
Everyone’s Children,” 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 637, 652 n.90 (2013); see also 
Ronen Bergman, Gilad Shalit and the Rising Price of an Israeli Life, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/magazine/gilad-shalit-and-
the-cost-of-an-israeli-life.html. 
 9. Lesley Terris & Orit Tykocynski, Inaction Inertia in International 
Negotiations: The Consequences of Missed Opportunities, BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI. 
701, 710 (2016). 
 10. Gilad Shalit, Held Hostage in Gaza for More Than Five Years, Released 
on 18 October 2011, B’TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/gilad_shalit 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 11. Terris & Tykocynski, supra note 9, at 710. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Schweitzer, supra note 7, at 34. 
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Israel.15 This objective was based on Israel’s experiences of past 
exchanges. According to Al-Magor, an organization for Israeli 
terror victims, “eighty percent of all terrorists released in the 
last three decades, either as a gesture of good faith to the 
Palestinians or as part of prisoner-exchange deals, have 
returned to terrorist activities.”16 Israel’s intelligence agencies 
claim that forty-five percent of those released in previous 
prisoner-exchange deals returned to terrorist activity, and the 
former head of Mossad argues that the Tannenbaum deal alone 
resulted in the murder of 231 Israelis by released prisoners.17 
To avoid the risk of further terror attacks after the Shalit 
prisoner transaction, 163 of the prisoners were expelled to the 
Gaza Strip and 43 abroad.18 Furthermore, it was agreed that the 
freed prisoners who were expelled to Gaza would stay there and 
would not be able to return to their homes in the West Bank for 
periods of up to twenty years, depending on their risk level.19 
Upon demonstration of good behavior, they would gradually be 
able to return to the West Bank.20 Prisoners who were released 
to their homes in Israel are not allowed to enter the West Bank, 
while those released to the West Bank are obligated to report to 
local police stations as a prearranged condition thereof.21 
Despite these arrangements, some prisoners released as 
part of the Shalit prisoner-exchange have already caused the 
loss of Israeli lives thereafter. These released prisoners 
publically expressed their will to re-engage in terror soon after 
their release.22 According to Shabak, Israel’s security agency, in 
2013 alone, forty terror attacks involving ex-prisoners released 
as part of the Shalit prisoner-exchange were blocked by the 
agency.23 Different Israeli news sources report that by now six 
Israelis have been murdered by released prisoners of the Shalit 
 
 15. Terris & Tykocynski, supra note 9, at 710. 
 16. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 653 n.94; see also News in Brief II, 
HAARETZ (Dec. 4, 2007), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news-in-brief-ii-
1.234506. 
 17. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 653 n.94; see also Bergman, supra note 
8. 
 18. Schweitzer, supra note 7, at 29. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Boaz Ganor & Ophir Falk, De-Radicalization in Israel’s Prison System, 
36 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 116, 124 (2013). 
 23. Shabak, Yearly Report for 2013, https://www.shabak.gov.il/
publications/Pages/study/2013.aspx (last visited May 22, 2018). 
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prisoner-exchange.24 At the time of writing this study, two 
Israeli civilians are reported to be held by Hamas, both of whom 
are claimed to be mentally ill, as well as the bodies of soldiers 
Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin.25 
This study will not engage in a classification of the Israeli-
Arab conflict according to international and humanitarian law, 
nor will it attempt to classify the status of prisoners from both 
sides under Geneva Conventions. For convenience, Israeli 
soldiers and bodies thereof will be referred to as “captives,” and 
the prisoners exchanged as “prisoners.” While such terms are not 
necessarily legally accurate, since they do not capture the 
differences which might affect the legal status of the parties 
involved, they serve to get the conversation going.26 
I. ISRAEL’S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE PRISONER-
EXCHANGE DEALS ON NUMERICALLY 
LOPSIDED TERMS 
One might find Israel’s readiness to strike such unbalanced 
prisoner-exchange deals somewhat baffling. However, Israel has 
unique cultural and social characteristics which motivate it to 
negotiate with captors, and to set an extremely high price tag on 
Israeli life. But, the Shalit prisoner-exchange has undermined 
the relative consensus status of such traditions, and placed it at 
the center of social debate and controversy. 
 
 24. Tamar Pileggi, Palestinians Freed in Shalit Deal Killed 6 Israelis Since 
2014, Times of Israel (July 20, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/
palestinians-freed-in-shalit-deal-killed-6-israelis-since-2014; Yoav Zitun, 
Shalit Deal Death Toll, 4 Years On, YNETNEWS.COM (July 20, 2015), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4681905,00.html. 
 25. Jack Khoury, After a Year of Silence, Israeli Bedouin Asks Hamas to 
Release His Son, Haaretz (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.713420; Jack Khoury & Shirly Seidler, Hamas Official: 
Mengistu Isn’t Mentally Unstable, Captured During Gaza War, Haaretz (July 
17, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.666501; Reut Rimerman & 
Ahiya Raved, Goldin, Shaul Families Slam PM Over Reports of Outlandish 
Hamas Demands, Y Net News (July 5, 2016), http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-4824377,00.html 
 26. See generally Eliyahu Winograd,The Commission of Inquiry into the 
Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report 502 (Jan. 2008). 
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A. MOTIVATION FOR PRISONER-EXCHANGE DEALS 
1. Old-time Jewish Traditions 
Scholars point out that the questions over prisoner 
exchange is an area where two often-rival elements of the 
character and nature of the state of Israel, the Jewish element 
and the democratic one, are actually in harmony.27 The 
framework for prisoner exchange is rooted in Jewish legal 
tradition (“Halacha”).28 The rescue of captives is considered a 
basic obligation under the Halacha and has been followed in 
Jewish communities for generations.29 To some, the Talmudic 
discussion might sound archaic and outdated. However, 
ministerial bodies and the Israeli Supreme Court often use 
references to the Talmud when prisoner-exchange deals are 
legally challenged.30 
Per the Halacha, captivity is perceived as the worst thing 
that can happen to a person. This approach is based on a specific 
interpretation of Jeremiah 15:2: “And it shall be that when they 
say to you, ‘Where should we go?’ then you are to tell them, ‘Thus 
says the LORD: “Those destined for death, to death; And those 
destined for the sword, to the sword; And those destined for 
famine, to famine; And those destined for captivity, to 
captivity.”‘31 Babylonian Talmud introduces Rabbi Johanan’s 
interpretation whereby the verse presents a scale of severity, as 
captivity holds the potential to include any of the other options 
listed above.32 
 
 
 
 
 27. CAPTIVES 151 (Merav Mack ed., Van Leer Jerusalem Inst., Zalman 
Shazar Ctr., 2014). 
 28. Id. at 152. 
 29. Ruth Levush, Israel: Legal Aspects of Prisoner Exchanges, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, L.L. File No. 2014-010825 (June 2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/
help/reports/pdf/2014-010825%20IL%20RPT.pdf. 
 30. See MICHAEL VIGODA, REDEEMING PRISONERS OF WAR AND BODIES IN 
EXCHANGE FOR RELEASING TERRORISTS, (2008) (an opinion submitted to the 
Shamgar Commission on October 7, 2008). 
 31. Jeremiah 15:2. 
 32. See Gittin 45a (June 12, 2017) http://www.come-and-
hear.com/gittin/gittin_45.html; Eytan M. Goldschein, Gilad Shalit & Prisoner 
Exchange: A Talmudic Perspective, SSRN (May 16, 2011), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1843225. 
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Scholars explain that the power to control a fellow human 
being, to be objectified by its captors and to be at their complete 
mercy without a shred of free will, is worse than death.33 
However, the obligation to redeem a captive is not without its 
limits. The Mishnah in Gittin states that a captive can only be 
redeemed for their monetary value because of Tikkun Olam—
”repairing the world.”34 Tikkun Olam has two alternative 
meanings according to the Talmud in this regard: one is that 
redeeming a captive above value places an unreasonable 
financial burden on communal funds; and alternatively, that 
redeeming captives above value encourages more kidnappings.35 
The monetary value of a captive was a person’s worth in the 
slave market, at a time where people could be considered 
legitimate merchandise.36 A different approach was to determine 
the captive’s value with reference to their contribution to 
society.37 The discussion to determine a person’s price tag is not 
in line with the notion of the “protect life principle”—namely, 
that a life may not be taken to protect anything else.38 According 
to this view, life in some contexts is seen to be of “immeasurable 
value.”39 Such a notion is in line with the biblical idea that each 
human was created in the image of God, and is thus the 
representative of God on earth. 
The argument here concerns that of the possibility of 
encouraging more kidnappings, and the risks it imposes on the 
lives of members of the community. The Talmud explains that if 
the Jewish community were to redeem captives above market 
value, it will encourage kidnappers to target the Jewish 
community further.40 
Most Talmudic rabbis have adopted the approach that 
forbids redeeming captives above value because it encourages 
further kidnapping. However, the Knesset Yechezkel writes that 
 
 33. VIGODA, supra note 30 at 153. 
 34. Gittin 45a, http://www.come-and-hear.com/gittin/gittin_45.html, June 
12, 2017; Eytan M. Goldschein, Gilad Shalit & Prisoner Exchange: A Talmudic 
Perspective, (May 16, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1843225. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions 14 (H.R. Rep No. 32–39, 2016). 
 39. Christof Heyns & Thomas Probert, The Right to Life and the Progressive 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, in MOVING AWAY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY 
214, 215 (2015). 
 40. Radvaz, Responsa on Shulchan Aruch: Yoreah Deah ch. 40. 
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in some circumstances, the Jews will be persecuted and 
kidnapped regardless.41 He concludes that “one must look long 
and hard before deciding not to redeem a Jewish soul at risk of 
death.”42 In the old days the question of whether the redemption 
of a prisoner, and its price, encouraged further kidnappings 
could only be answered by the community’s instincts and life 
experiences. Nowadays, however, research is available to guide 
such considerations. Research analyses on prisoner swaps in 
Israel show that, as expected, the “cost” of redemption indeed 
does encourage future kidnappings.43 Furthermore, a “resilient” 
approach of non-negotiation has the power of stopping specific 
types of kidnappings altogether.44 This does not, however, 
remove the problem that if each life is of infinite value, it is 
impossible to balance one life against many in a meaningful way. 
2. Israeli Soldiers as “Everyone’s Children” 
Some scholars argue that Israel’s current captivity policies 
stem above all from the increasing influence of the ethos that 
Israeli soldiers are “everyone’s children.”45 The IDF is perceived 
as a central national institution and enjoys wide social approval 
within Israel, a country deeply divided on most other issues.46 
Israeli society as a whole is deeply committed to the well-being 
of its combat soldiers and their families.47 Even the most 
outspoken critics of Israeli policy serve in the IDF when 
required, despite the legal option of conscientious objection.48 In 
fact, in the years 2005–2007, only 125 soldiers applied for 
 
 41. Goldschein, supra note 32, at 12; Knesset Yechezkel, Responsa on 
Shulchan Aruch: Yoreah Deah ch. 38. 
 42. Goldschein, supra note 32, at 12; Knesset Yechezkel, Responsa on 
Shulchan Aruch: Yoreah Deah ch. 38. 
 43. Gilboa, supra note 6. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 647. 
 46. Id. at 647–48. 
 47. See Id. at 648. 
 48. See, e.g., Itay Blumenthal, Peace Now Chief Does Reserve Duty in West 
Bank, YNETNEWS.COM (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,
7340,L-4648489,00.html (describing how Yariv Oppenheimer, the Director of 
Peace Now, an non-governmental organization, and one of the most outspoken 
critics of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, nevertheless served as a 
reservist in the Settlements, describing it as his “civilian duty.”). Oppenheimer 
explained, “I want to believe that when the day comes that the order is not to 
guard settlements, but to vacate settlements, then my friends on the right 
would do the same.” Id. 
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conscientious exemption from service.49 
This ethos, that soldiers are everyone’s children, is not new, 
and has influenced Israel’s decision making for decades. Its 
origins have different theories. Some attribute it to the increase 
of parental involvement in the army.50 Others attribute it to the 
“doubts Israelis now harbor with regard to recent national 
decisions about recourse to force,”51 changes in the masculine 
identity of men, who can now be seen as vulnerable and child-
like, and the perception of threats within Israeli society.52 
Another possible explanation is that, unlike Israel’s early days, 
the present generation of parents are ex-soldiers themselves, 
who can better relate to the implications of military service as a 
result of mandatory military service in Israel.53 
This strong personal identification with the soldiers and 
their family members creates an urgency in redeeming those 
held captive, as a family’s uncertainty regarding their child’s 
condition is perceived as worse than death: 
The captive is living-dead, dying bit by bit. In contrast to 
the dead, he senses his death for a long time. The blood 
of the captive’s family is also spilled: The family lives in 
paralyzing uncertainty, pinned without a target date or 
liberation on the horizon. The relatives experience 
captivity as a black hole that swallows their lives . . . . 
Society’s sense of responsibility for the captive is a 
manifestation of solidarity towards one of the group, just 
because he is one of the group.54 
In the original text, “one of the group” is “ben hahavura,” 
which has a double meaning—both one of the group and the 
group’s child or son. 
 
 
 
 49. Daniel Statman, Critical Reflections on the Exemption of Pacifists from 
Military Service, 31 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 669, 703 (2009). 
 50. See, e.g., Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 643. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Zipi Israeli & Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, Men and Boys: 
Representations of Israeli Combat Soldiers in the Media, 30 ISRAEL STUD. REV. 
66 (2015). 
 53. EDNA LOMSKY-FEDER & EYAL BEN-ARI, THE MILITARY AND MILITARISM 
IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 304–05 (1999). 
 54. AVI SAGI & YEDIDIA Z. STERN, BAREFOOT HOMELAND: ISRAELI 
REFLECTIONS 223–24 (2011). 
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The ethos of “everyone’s children” has fueled many decisions 
made by the Israeli government. Some of these decisions are 
perceived as positive while others are not. Israel’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon was largely attributed to public pressure, 
mobilized by the “Four Mothers Movement,” an NGO led by 
women whose soldier-sons were fighting in the conflict.55 
However, “the ethos of ‘everyone’s children’ has sometimes 
compromised military actions, leading the IDF to prioritize 
casualty avoidance so highly as to impair its ability to 
accomplish military goals.”56 
Israel’s endless efforts to redeem captives reassure parents 
about their children’s future military service, and contribute to 
the legitimacy of the IDF in Israeli society. There is an unwritten 
agreement in Israeli society whereby eighteen year-olds 
contribute a few years of their lives to protect the state, and 
Israel, in return will spare no effort in keeping them alive and 
well. While global criticism regarding Israel’s action during 
wartime is that it disproportionately targets Palestinian 
civilians, Israelis criticize their leadership for over-protecting 
Palestinian civilians at the expense of Israeli soldiers.57 
Public pressure to redeem captives is massive, and in the 
age of modern media and social networks, such pressure is 
unavoidable. Decision makers are finding it harder and harder 
to make sound and balanced decisions due to constant pressure 
from the media and captives’ families to redeem captives at any 
cost.58 Scholars point out that the effect of public pressure has 
been increasing over the years: 
[E]ven national leaders who previously opposed prisoner 
exchanges, such as current Israeli Prime Minister 
Binyamin Netanyahu, have bowed to public pressure and 
approved deals even more generous than those they once 
vehemently opposed. In fact, with each such transaction, 
Israel has found itself agreeing to release even more 
prisoners in return for each Israeli soldier.59 
 
 55. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 645. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Jason Burke, Gaza School Attack Denounced As ‘Criminal Act’ 
by UN Chief, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/aug/03/israel-air-strike-un-school-gaza-rafah. 
 58. VIGODA, supra note 30, at 2. 
 59. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 652. 
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Public pressure is effective because it is directed at the 
softest spot of Israeli society—the soldiers, many of whom are 
still regarded by some as children. The most common argument 
against the non-negotiation approach is “imagine if it was your 
child.” In Israel, where most families have (or will have) family 
members in active military service or reserves, this question is 
always a loaded one, and never easily answered. 
B. RECENT DEBATES IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 
The “redeem at any cost” approach, influenced by the 
“everyone’s children” ethos, is only one side of the equation. In 
recent years, as the cost of redemption grew higher, critics have 
challenged prisoner-exchange policies. It is widely accepted that 
the actions of the Israeli government have, in fact encouraged 
further kidnappings of soldiers.60 Israeli actions also serve to 
demean the worth of Arabs, whose lives are implicitly seen as 
worth only a fraction of those of Israelis, thus perpetuating 
harmful perceptions of inequality and contributing to the 
dehumanization of Israel’s neighbors who might be perceived as 
of a “lesser value.” 
Scholars observe that the Israeli discussion regarding 
captives is shaped by four different elements: political 
representatives, the security and intelligence community, 
captives’ families, and the media.61 The changing balance of 
power among those elements leads to different actions and 
possible outcomes.62 
1. Legislative Attempts to Limit the Scope of Prisoner-
exchange Deals 
In 2010 the Shamgar Committee was appointed to propose 
principles for conducting negotiations for the release of captives. 
The Committee’s conclusions have not yet been released to the 
public.63 After the Shamgar Report was released to the 
government, several bills were introduced in the Knesset, some 
 
 60. Winograd supra note 26, at 503. 
 61. Mack, supra note 27, at 198. 
 62. Id. at 199. 
 63. Levush, supra note 29, at 5 (explaining that although the Shamgar 
Committee, which was appointed in 2010, presented its report to the 
government in January 2012, the report was classified as “highly secret” and 
has not been fully disclosed to the Israeli public). 
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of which have been said to reflect the exact recommendations of 
the report. Several bills aimed to limit the government trade-off 
during prisoner-exchange deals to one prisoner in exchange for 
one Israeli captive.64 Another aspect of the bills was the attempt 
to worsen the condition of convicted terrorists within Israeli 
prisons.65 So far, none of the bills have matured into actual law, 
as all have been stopped at different stages of the legislative 
process. 
More subtle bills, which amended existing laws to limit the 
scope of prisoner-exchange practices, have accomplished more 
than the aggressive bills above. In 2014, the Knesset approved 
Basic Law: President of the State (Amendment – Prohibition on 
Release of Murderers) Bill. This bill aimed to limit the 
president’s power to pardon offenders of the most serious crimes 
and to limit prisoner-exchange deals to only prisoners who have 
not committed murder.66 The amendment has not gained 
sufficient support at the Knesset Plenum, and has been left out 
of the statute book. However, two separate amendments were 
passed to completion, which restricted governmental rather 
than presidential powers of clemency.67 
Among the Laws that were passed is Government Law 
(Amendment No. 9) (Release of Prisoners for State or Security 
Considerations) 5774-2014, which introduces restrictions on the 
power of the government and its members to authorize, initiate, 
or pursue prisoner releases for “state or security reasons.”68 In 
addition it establishes that exchanged prisoners are released on 
probation, and authorizes the re-arrest of prisoners in 
 
 64. Among such bills are: Draft Bill Principles for the Redemption of 
Captives and kidnapped Persons, 5774–2014, HH (Knesset) No. 2437 p. 19 
(Isr.); Draft Bill Principles for the Redemption of Captives and Kidnapped 
Persons, 5771–2011, HH (Knesset) No. 3626 p. 18 (Isr.); Draft Bill Principles 
for the Redemption of Captives and Missing Persons,5776–2016, HH (Knesset) 
No. 1847 p. 20 (Isr.); Draft Bill, Principles for the Redemption of Captives and 
Missing Persons, 2018, HH (Knesset) No. 5047 p. 20. 
 65. See Draft Bill Principles for the Redemption of Captives and Missing 
Persons, 2016, HH (Knesset) No. 1847 p. 20, art. 3 (Isr.); Draft Bill, Principles 
for the Redemption of Captives and Missing Persons, 2018, HH (Knesset) No. 
5047 p. 20. art. 4 (Isr.). 
 66. Draft Bill for Prohibition on Release of Murderers (Legislative 
Amendment), 5774–2014, HH (Knesset) No. 2113 p. 19 (Isr.). 
 67. Levush, supra note 29 at 8; Government Law (Release of Prisoners for 
State or Security Considerations), 5774–2014, SH No. 2467 p. 730 (Isr.) 
amending Government Law, 5761–2001, SH No. 1780, p. 168 (Isr.) (as 
amended); Draft Bill for Parole (Legislative Amendments), 5774–2014, HH 
(Knesset) No. 2113 p. 19 (Isr.). 
 68. Levush, supra note 29, at 8. 
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accordance with conditions enumerated by the law.69 The law 
thus does not forbid prisoner exchange, nor does it set a solid 
exchange ratio, but rather regularizes the procedure of prisoner 
selection to be exchanged.70 Even though the amendment clearly 
aims to limit prisoner-exchange deals, it can be viewed as giving 
it some legislative and permanent approval. 
Parole Law (Amendment No. 14), 5775-2014 prohibits the 
Parole Committee from reviewing early release requests of 
prisoners serving life sentences for acts of murder which the 
courts have determined to be exceptionally heinous, unless at 
least fifteen years have passed from the day of the sentencing; 
the sentence cannot be commuted to less than forty years.71 The 
classification of the severity of the murder committed is under 
the authority of the court, which as a result has the power to 
determine in a given case whether a prisoner could be a 
candidate for an exchange deal in the future.72 
The amendments above, are still relatively new, and their 
actual influence is yet to be discovered, however, they could 
theoretically diminish prisoners’ re-engagement in terror, which 
is a tempting belief to which to subscribe. The promise of a fast-
lane to re-imprisonment combined with the prohibition on the 
release of exceptionally heinous murders clearly sits well with 
the expectation to avoid second-time offenders. 
Since the Parole Law does not specify the elements to 
account for exceptionally heinous murder, the respective 
doctrine is to be developed gradually by the courts as relevant 
cases are discussed and analyzed. Israeli courts have interpreted 
that the goal of those components is not to deter prisoners from 
re-engaging in terror, since it is clear that imprisonment does 
not deter ideological terrorists, but to keep such prisoners 
behind bars for as long as possible.73 Not any murder classified 
as a terror act constitutes such crime. The essence and 
circumstances of the crime are the relevant factors, and not the 
motive behind it.74 Elements which would often be regarded as 
“exceptionally heinous” include inter alia the murder of children 
and babies, murder committed while abusing the victims’ trust, 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. D.Cr.C. 51040-11-14/8 Israel v. Hashia (Sept. 4, 2016), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 74. Id. at 7. 
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murder involving torture, and murders involving multiple 
victims.75 
It is not clear whether such doctrine would in fact help to 
prevent lives lost because of released prisoners. When reviewing 
cases of released prisoners who reengaged in terror, not all 
original cases necessarily constitute an exceptionally heinous 
crime.76 Therefore, the new offenses would not be prevented by 
the new amendment. It is, however, too soon for this argument 
to be made, mostly since the doctrine is still being developed and 
expected to evolve over time. 
2. Death Penalty to Terrorists Bill 
Some argue that a possible solution to the cycle of prisoner 
exchange is to impose the death penalty on terrorists.77 Such 
policy must be universally applied: 
[T]he murder of the Palestinian boy by three Israelis in 
a recent event [reference to the kidnapping and murder 
of Mohammed Abu Khdeir] [was] an egregious act of 
terrorism, and the death penalty may be appropriate. 
Similarly, the Palestinians who murdered the three 
Israeli teens could be punished by death penalty.78 
One proposal is to execute terrorists who have been serving 
out a life sentence as an immediate response to an abduction as 
soon as it occurs.79 Such an approach seems to be in 
contradiction with many human rights as well as the basic 
 
 75. Id.; D.Cr.C. 53758-07-13 Israel v. Ali Amtirat, (Dec. 15, 2015) Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Judge Diskin in Hashia 
counts “the intention to cause damage greater than the killing committed” as 
an element of “exceptionally heinous murder.” D.Cr.C. 51040-11-14/8 Israel v. 
Hashia (Sept. 4, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
It is unclear whether she refers to greater damage in the form of the attempt of 
more killings, or to a rather ambiguous damage, such as political damage. Id. 
The facts of the case in question combined with her opinion that not every 
terror-murder is necessarily an exceptionally heinous one, lead to the 
conclusion that the first interpretation is the correct one. Id. 
 76. E.g., Abbas Demands Terrorists’ Release from Prison, ALMAGOR, 
http://al-magor.com/?page_id=251com/?page_id=251 (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
 77. Justus R. Weiner, Leave No Man Behind: The United States and Israel 
Face Risks in Their Prisoner Release Policies, 39 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.7, 
17–20 (2015). 
 78. Id. at 25. 
 79. Id. at 18. 
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principle of the rule of law. 
Another approach is to reintroduce the death penalty into 
the Israeli legal system—not as an immediate response to an 
abduction as described above, but as a punishment ruled by the 
court after conviction. As a result, “exceptionally heinous” 
murderers would be executed after conviction, and thus be 
effectively un-exchangeable.80 Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s 
current Minister of Defense, based his 2015 party’s election 
campaign on this approach, with the phrase “death to terrorists” 
as its slogan.81 
Lieberman’s party members, together with other Knesset 
members, initiated a bill aimed at amending the penal code, so 
as to impose capital punishment on terrorists convicted of 
murder, with a simple majority of judges.82 Simultaneously, 
Knesset member Sharon Gal and others initiated a similar 
version of the same bill.83 The explanatory notes of both bills 
mentioned prisoners exchange as one of their justifications.84 
The bills were heavily criticized by politicians throughout the 
political spectrum, scholars and activists.85 In an opinion 
presented to the Ministers Legislative Committee by the Israel 
Democracy Institution, it was argued that imposing the death 
penalty on terrorists might actually encourage kidnappings, 
since the period of time during which the trial takes place could 
serve as an opportunity for terrorist organizations to kidnap 
soldiers and civilians and use them as bargaining chips to 
prevent the execution of their members.86 
 
 80. Ruth Levush, Israel: Provisions on Parole of Convicted Murders, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (ISR.) (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
news/article/israel-provisions-on-parole-of-convicted-murderers/. 
 81. TOI Staff, Defense Minister Slams UN Criticism of Azaria Sentence, 
TIMES ISR. (Feb. 24, 2017 5:42 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-
minister-slams-un-criticism-of-azaria-sentence/?fb_comment_id=
1273636549398488_1274723612623115#f215a0e299f54e8. 
 82. Draft Bill, Death Penalty for People Convicted of Terrorism (Legislative 
Amendments), 2015, HH (Knesset) No. 567588 p. 20, 2221 (Isr.) (amending 
Israel: Penal Law, 5737-1977). 
 83. Id. at 1157. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See e.g, EU Condemns Israel’s ‘Terrorist’ Bill, Says Death Penalty is 
‘Inhuman,’ AL BAWABA NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.albawaba.
com/news/eu-condemns-israels-terrorist-bill-says-death-penalty-inhuman-
1069196. 
 86. See MORDECHAI KREMNITZER & AMIR FUCHS, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST., 
DRAFT BILL, DEATH PENALTY FOR PEOPLE CONVICTED OF TERRORISM 
(LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT), 2015, (Mar. 16, 2017), https://en.idi.org.il/media/
3728/death_penalty_1732016.pdf. 
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It was also suggested that a simpler, more humane way to 
stop prisoner exchanges is to forbid such deals altogether rather 
than kill prisoners.87 Sharon Gal’s bill was finally put to vote and 
rejected by the Knesset in the preliminary vote stage by an 
overwhelming majority of 94:6.88 
In 2017, Lieberman’s party presented the bill once again.89 
On January 3, 2018, the new bill was put to preliminary vote 
and approved by the Knesset by a scarce majority of 51:49.90 The 
bill still needs to be approved in three additional Readings 
(voting rounds) in order to emerge as a law—and even then, it is 
expected to confront judicial review and intervention, which 
might disqualify it as unconstitutional. 
The bill, controversial as it is, might find some support 
within the general public. According to research conducted by 
the Israel Democracy Institute in October 2015, approximately 
53% of the Jewish interviewees agreed with the statement that 
“every Palestinian who has perpetrated a terror attack against 
Jews should be killed on the spot, even if he has been 
apprehended and no longer poses a threat.”91 Meanwhile, 70.4% 
of the Jewish interviewees also regarded the punishments that 
Israeli courts usually impose on Palestinians who have carried 
out terror attacks as “too light.”92 
Analysis of the data shows that there is a correlation 
between people who demonstrated their desire to punish 
terrorist Palestinians more harshly in the aforementioned 
survey and the people who showed mistrust in Israeli 
institutions and their capability to deal with terrorism.93 It is 
possible that Israelis do not trust their justice system and 
 
 87. See Id. 
 88. See Press Release, Knesset, Death Penalty to Terrorists Bill Rejected 
in Preliminary Vote, (July 15, 2015), http://main.knesset.gov.il/News/Press
Releases/Pages/press150715-ko.aspx. 
 89. See Draft Bill for Death Penalty for People Convicted of Terrorism 
(Legislative Amendments), 5778-2017, HH (Knesset) No. 4638 (Isr.); see also 
Draft Bill for Death Penalty for People Convicted of Terrorism (Legislative 
Amendments), 5778-2017, HH (Knesset) No. 4622 (Isr.) (featuring similar 
content). 
 90. See Press Release, Knesset, Death Penalty for Terrorists Bill Approved 
in Preliminary Reading (Jan. 4, 2018), http://knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_
eng.asp?PRID=13714. 
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 93. See תגירה עוגיפ תוריזב םילרטונמ םילבחמ, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Nov. 10, 
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government to keep perpetrators behind bars, and therefore 
seek to achieve justice by their own means. As such, the 
prisoner-exchange policy may very well contribute to such 
mistrust. 
The questions presented by the Democratic Institute were 
echoed in a debate throughout Israeli society regarding the El’or 
Azaria trial. Azaria is an Israeli soldier who shot an 
apprehended Palestinian man who a few minutes before had 
stabbed Azaria’s friend. Azaria was sentenced to only eighteen 
months in prison.94 It has been argued that prisoner-exchange 
deals have had a “cardinal effect” on the public’s support of 
Azaria’s actions, and that they have contributed to the notion 
that people need to take the law into their own hands and kill 
perpetrators at the scene.95 This is due to the “contempt of the 
penal procedure” created by Israel’s prisoner-exchange 
policies.96 In other words, there is a sentiment among people that 
justice is not being achieved, since a perpetrator who is brought 
to trial and convicted may not need to complete his time in prison 
as they might be released the next day through an exchange. 
When people lose trust in the system, they tend to seek their own 
means of justice. This is a dangerous phenomenon that harms 
the very core of democracy. 
It is interesting to note that by the same logic of killing 
prisoners to avoid prisoner-exchange deals, there is the notion of 
killing Israeli captives at the scene to avoid such deals. Up until 
recently, the IDF “Hannibal Directive” guided soldiers to use 
maximum force to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers, even at 
the risk of harming them in the process.97 Scholars interpreted 
the Directive as implying that captive-exchange deals have such 
devastating implication on Israel, in which the state believes it 
would be better if the soldier did not make it to captivity alive.98 
 
 94. See Mil. Appeal 182/16, El’or Azaria v. Chief Military Prosecutor (Feb. 
21, 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/ch2news-attach/2017/07/%D7%A4%
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The directive was abolished in 2011 because of the different 
interpretations by different ranks in the IDF and the criticism 
that the directive had attracted.99 
II. LEGAL APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE TO 
THE ISRAELI-ARAB PRISONER-EXCHANGE 
CUSTOM 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 
article 3 that “everyone has the right to life.”100 The right to life 
is protected in article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights as well, stating that “every human being has 
an inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one should be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”101 Such definition 
gives the right to life a unique status, as it is the only right in 
the International Bill of Human Rights described as 
“inherent.”102 Scholars suggest that the Covenant treats the 
right to life to the individual similarly as states’ right to self-
defense, which is also described as “inherent.”103 It does not 
derive its validity from international instruments and their 
ratification by states; rather, it exists independently. The right 
to life does not cease in times of war; only then it is interpreted 
with reference to international humanitarian law.104 
In its first General Comment on the right to life under the 
ICCPR, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) noted that “the 
right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted.”105 The 
Committee asserted that the inherent right to life “cannot be 
understood in a restrictive manner and that states need to adopt 
 
 99. Amos Harel, Israel’s Military Chief Orders to Revoke Controversial 
‘Hannibal’ Directive, HAARETZ (June 28, 2016, 6:40 AM), https://www.haaretz.
com/israel-news/.premium-idf-chief-orders-to-revoke-controversial-hannibal-
directive-1.5402252. 
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 101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 
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 103. Id. at 246. 
 104. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶25 (July 8). 
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positive measures to protect it.”106 States are obliged to respect 
and protect the right to life—to refrain from extrajudicial 
killings while also actively keeping people’s lives safe.107 
International tribunals have adopted the positive obligation of 
the right to life in various cases.108 
In Barbato v. Uruguay, the HRC found a violation of the 
right to life when state officials were held responsible by an act 
or omission for not taking enough measures to protect life.109 In 
the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court 
determined that states must not only refrain from killing 
individuals, but also ensure the full exercise of the right to life, 
by preventing, investigating and punishing any violation.110 The 
jurisprudence of positive obligation under the right to life is said 
to be most developed under the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR).111 In Oneryildiz v. Turkey, the Court recognized 
a duty on the state to create and develop a legislative and 
administrative framework to provide effective deterrence 
against threats to the right to life.112 In Osman v. UK, the ECHR 
emphasized the positive obligation upon state parties to 
preserve the lives of those in their jurisdiction by effective 
criminal law provisions and law enforcement machinery, as well 
as preventive operational measures when necessary.113 In Kaya 
v. Turkey, it was determined that the right to life was breached 
due to the absence of an effective criminal law regime in one of 
the state’s regions.114 
The “protect life” principle assumes that each life is of 
immeasurable value.115 The mere act of prisoner exchange is in 
conflict with such a notion in the sense that it puts a price tag 
on prisoners’ lives and uses people as bargaining chips. The 
disproportional trade is problematic both in the sense that both 
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sides implicitly agree that Israeli lives are worth more, and in a 
practical sense when such trade encourages Hamas to capture 
Israeli soldiers to promise further trades, and for Israel to keep 
prisoners detained to be able to participate in future trades. 
Additionally, the right to life can be found in Israeli law as 
well, under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Law 
establishes that “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or 
dignity of any person as such.”116 
Prisoner-exchange equation involves both identifiable life at 
hand (the soldier who will be killed if not swapped) and the risk 
of statistical lives (future victims of terror attacks). In addition, 
there is a vague threat to human lives emerging from the 
deterioration of trust in the legal system and the threat of 
reintroducing the death sentence. 
A. WEIGHING LIVES 
The fields of morals and ethics have long tried to tackle the 
issue of conflicting rights to life. While the protect life principle 
assumes that each life is of immeasurable value, the violence 
reduction approach, which is of a utilitarian nature, seeks to 
minimize the net quantity of human lives lost.117 
The problematic nature of the weighing of lives is often 
demonstrated by the hypothetical trolley problem.118 Imagine 
that a trolley’s breaks have failed, and there are five people on 
the track who will be killed unless the driver diverts to another 
track. Diverting would save the original five people, but kill one 
person standing on the second track. Most people feel that 
diverting the trolley is justified due to the net gain in human 
life.119 When analyzed, there is a slight discomfort with the fact 
that the driver is taking explicit action to kill the person on the 
second track as he diverts, but, the action/omission aspect does 
not seem to bother us as much. If we take the scenario whereby 
an innocent healthy person walks into a hospital, people would 
tend to think that it would be morally abhorrent for a doctor to 
kill the person in order to use his organs to save the lives of five 
others. Although the two problems have similar elements—
killing one to save five—Thompson explains that the scenarios 
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are different as “deflecting a threat from a larger group to a 
smaller one” is different from “bringing a different threat to bear 
on the smaller group.”120 
After, the September 11 events, an incident where a 
deranged man had seized an aircraft in January 2003 and 
threatened to fly it into the European Central Bank in Frankfurt 
led to a right-to-life-cantered discussion in Germany.121 A 
German court was to determine the constitutionality of Section 
14 of the Air Safety Act which provided that the armed forces 
might, to prevent the occurrence of an especially serious 
accident, divert an aircraft, force it to land, or carry out direct 
action against an aircraft if it could be assumed that the aircraft 
was going to be used against human life.122 All steps were to be 
taken by giving due consideration to necessity and 
proportionality.123 The court stated that a human life must be 
protected regardless of its prospective duration and that human 
beings were not to be treated as mere objects of the state.124 
The court’s decision was criticized by scholars who noted 
that while the notion that “one life cannot be set off against 
another” is desirable to apply, sometimes “there may be no other 
way than to start counting lives.”125 It is, however, not clear what 
the scope of the balance is. This is can be viewed as even from a 
utilitarian perspective, but it is not so easy to assess whether 
more lives would be saved in the long term. Michael J. Sandel, a 
Harvard professor, notes that even if more lives are saved in a 
single scenario, it might have a broader negative consequence 
for society as a whole such as weakening the norm against 
murder and increasing people’s tendency to take the law into 
their own hands.126 Such consequences could harm the right to 
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life concept and bring more casualties than the lives that were 
saved. 
Different right to life approaches lead to different possible 
actions in the kidnapped soldier scenario. First, at the moment 
of the kidnapping, if applying the German court approach, then 
the Hannibal Procedure is forbidden as it breaches the soldier’s 
right to life. As a result, he may not be used as an object to avoid 
exchange, and is entitled to the state’s protection even in the 
case whereby he will not be exchanged and surely killed. 
When examining the soldier’s right to life in captivity, as 
well as weighing it against future victims’ right to life, it is not 
the standard scenario of sacrificing one life to save many—but a 
scenario of sacrificing one to potentially save many. The life of 
the identified soldier at risk is not weighed against other 
identified people whose lives are currently under threat. The 
lives on the other side of the scale are “statistical people,” whose 
death may be prevented. The Israeli policy of expulsing released 
prisoners is an attempt to change the statistics. There is also the 
attempt to have it all: release the captive soldier and avoid 
incurring future victims. How does such a possibility affect the 
life-weighing balance? Or in other words, do statistical people 
bear the right to life in the same way as identifiable ones? 
B. IDENTIFIABLE PEOPLE VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES 
Joseph Stalin purportedly said, “The death of one man is a 
tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic.”127 It is largely 
agreed upon in the sphere of psychology that people are often 
willing to allocate greater resources to save the lives of identified 
beings rather than to save equal (or even greater) numbers of 
unidentified or statistical victims, a phenomenon known as the 
“Identifiable Victim Effect.”128 While identifiable victims 
naturally produce a greater empathic response from people, it 
affects public policy as well.129 
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Governments and policymakers have to make decisions 
involving the dilemma of identifiable people versus statistical 
lives all the time, usually in terms of the allocation of funds and 
health care. Given the reality of limited funds, policymakers 
need to determine whether to allocate funds to treat identifiable 
patients rather than to invest in prevention. The preference of 
identifiable victims has manifested into a legal norm called “the 
rule of rescue.”130 The general statement is that “saving the lives 
of some persons who are in need here and now may justify 
investing much energy and money, even if it is clear that society 
could prevent many more deaths by investing such resources in 
prevention.”131 Albert Jonsen, who coined the term of 
“Identifiable Victim Effect,” explains that the moral instinct to 
“save the doomed” is a deontological imperative, more 
compulsory than rational.132 Scholars interpret it as based on 
human solidarity.133 Some argue against it and claim that it is 
flawed as a legal concept—since it enshrines the value of 
solidarity over fairness and justice in an undesired way.134 Dan 
W. Brock argues for the principle of the “equal moral worth of all 
human lives.”135 According to this principle all human persons 
deserve equal moral concern and respect, and that, all else being 
equal, saving more lives rather than fewer is morally better, so 
long as the beneficiaries are chosen fairly.136 So, all else being 
equal, identified and statistical lives have equal moral value.137 
While most legal fields prefer identifiable lives, there is an 
exception. Statistical lives are of most importance in the realm 
of environmental law, where they are supposed to be protected, 
sometimes at all costs.138 Theoretically, statistical lives are of 
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living persons, but can also concern the unborn. While there 
seems to be an agreement that unidentifiable living people have 
a right to life, there is academic disagreement regarding the 
unborn.139 
C. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE LOSS OF LIVES 
The protection of the right to life has two components: the 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivations of life, and “the 
requirement of proper investigation and accountability where 
there is a reason to believe that an arbitrary deprivation of life 
may have taken place.”140 In fact, the failure to hold violators 
accountable (starting with an effective investigation) is itself a 
violation of the right to life.141 
The accountability aspect is compromised when prisoners 
are released from prison in contradiction to the legal process and 
its outcomes. Such breach of the right to life often leads to 
mistrust in the justice system and the state, and may lead to 
further infringements of the right to life in the form of 
vigilantism.142 The phenomena of vigilantism and the 
deterioration of the norm against taking lives can be linked to 
prisoner exchanges as in the El’or Azaria case and the “Death to 
Terrorists” bills. 
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Accountability requires a transparent, clear and just 
process, while the concept of prisoner exchange is foreign to a 
normal and typical democratic legal process. Rather, it 
somewhat resembles the grant of impunity, as prisoners are 
released from prison before serving their time, due to exterior 
motives rather than personal relevant circumstances (such as 
good behavior, for example). International human rights law 
generally holds impunities as being incompatible, especially 
with regard to the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective 
remedy.143 Impunities are described as one of the main reasons 
for the reoccurrence of violence. 144 Impunity, as interfering with 
the accountability requirement of the protection of the right to 
life, could in itself be accounted a breach of the right to life: 
Under international law, violations of the right to life 
involve both the taking of individual life by State 
actors . . . and a failure by the State to exercise due 
diligence to prevent killings by non-State actors. 
Violations also result from the failure to adequately 
investigate, properly identify and hold perpetrators to 
account and to provide reparation to the victims. The 
Special Rapporteur recalls that impunity under such 
circumstances is in itself a violation of the right to 
life . . . .145 
The release of prisoners is indeed a failure to hold 
perpetrators accountable and to provide reparation to the 
victims. 
Ben Saul, a scholar in international law, specifically 
terrorism and human rights, has examined the differences 
between impunity for terrorists and other perpetrators.146 He 
argues that some of the justifications for impunity, such as 
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national reconciliation and the restoration of harmony, do not 
apply to terror crimes, since they attack the very institutions of 
the state and the community that the state protects.147 On the 
other hand, Saul argues that amnesties for terrorism may be 
appropriate where it is sectarian and affects significant parts of 
the population, or in specific cases where lives are at imminent 
risk.148 Although Saul refers to large-scale risk, such as 
escalating violence from a sector which will be appeased by the 
grant of impunities, in the prisoner-exchange scenario there is 
also a life at risk—the captured. The argument for saving other 
lives is in line with the protect-life principle, whereby the right 
to life may be breached only to save other lives. 
D. THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE “DEATH TO TERRORISTS” 
BILL 
As described in Section I above, the “Death to Terrorists” bill 
is still pending. It is important to note that its approval would 
not be in line with the protect-life principle, which determines 
that life can only be taken to save other lives. However, 
international law does allow some room for the punishment of 
death (ICCPR Article 6.2),149 and therefore some argue that it is 
not inherently abolitionist in its approach.150 However, it is at 
the very least “progressively abolitionist.”151 
The abolitionist approach is attributed to international law 
since it requires the abolition of capital punishment either 
immediately or by taking steps in this direction.152 This 
approach is reflected in article 6.6 of the ICCPR which states 
that nothing in Article 6 “shall be invoked to delay or to prevent 
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party.”153 The 
progressive abolitionist approach was later reaffirmed in 
Resolution 2857 (XXVI) stating that “in order fully to guarantee 
the right to life . . . the main objective to be pursued is that of 
progressively restricting the number of offenses for which capital 
punishment may be imposed, with a view to the desirability of 
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abolishing this punishment in all countries;”154 as well as the 
Second Optional Protocol of the ICCPR 1981, stating that “all 
measures of abolition of the death penalty should be considered 
as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life.”155 
International law strictly forbids states that have abolished 
the death sentence to re-introduce it.156 The state of Israel never 
officially removed the death penalty from its book of laws, but is 
considered “de-facto abolitionists” since it has passed the 
threshold of not committing any execution for more than ten 
years.157 
In this Author’s opinion, even the classic arguments for the 
death penalty which are based on deterrence (an argument that 
is heavily contested as it is),158 are not relevant in this case. 
Generally speaking, people who engage in terror have strong 
ideological motives and are willing to die for their cause, and are 
thus not likely to be deterred by the punishment of death; it 
might actually encourage terrorists by granting them status of 
“martyrs” after executed by the enemy.159 A much more effective 
way to stop the prisoner-exchange cycle is to stop altogether the 
exchange of prisoners, rather than executing them as a 
“preventive measure.” It seems that such a law would only 
benefit the government who will be spared of the need to make 
a controversial and highly explosive decision (whether it chooses 
to exchange or refuses to do so). 
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III. IMPROVEMENT AND REGULATION OF 
PRISONER-EXCHANGE POLICY TO BETTER 
COMPLY WITH THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
A. LIMITATIONS TO THE SCOPE OF PRISONER EXCHANGE 
Even though there were several attempts to limit the scope 
of prisoner exchange, none were successful. Such limitation is 
important in the context of the right to life in order to minimize 
the risk to future potential victims by released prisoners, as well 
as to discourage future captivation attempts. Setting such 
limitations on the scope of prisoner exchange policy might be 
easier to legislate soon after an exchange is made, when no 
identified captives are at stake. Such timing would solve the 
identified versus statistical lives dilemma, as at that point in 
time all relevant lives would be statistical. That being said, 
waiting for a time of no captives at all might undesirably 
postpone and hold back much-needed legislation that can change 
the face of the upcoming exchange and its implications. 
First and foremost, in order to comply with the protect-life 
principle, the prisoner-exchange policy must be limited to living 
captives rather than the dead bodies thereof. The right to life 
applies to all living human beings. While there is disagreement 
regarding the incipient moment of the right to life, as well as a 
discussion regarding its expiration in ambiguous situations such 
as brain death, it is clear that once a person is completely and 
utterly dead, he no longer has a right to life.160Since the state of 
Israel and its institutions have reported that prisoner exchanges 
have caused further killings,161 such risk can only be taken by 
the state to save another life. Thus, an exchange to save a living 
captive will be in line with the right to life while an exchange to 
return a captive body is not. While the family whose loved one’s 
body is kept as a bargaining chip has a clear desire to receive the 
body, from a public perspective, it does not meet the threshold of 
the immeasurable value of human life that the protect-life 
principle sets. 
The utilitarian and the violence-reduction approach would 
favor a strict limitation upon the ratio of released prisoners in 
exchange for a captive, preferably a 1:1 ratio. Setting an equal 
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“value” to Israeli and Arab lives could contribute to greater 
equality between the parties and prevent the act of demeaning 
Arab lives. Such equality might create a better starting point for 
future peace negotiations. Golda Meir was famous for saying 
“Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more 
than they hate us”162 —this is, of course, an Israeli perspective 
of how Israel’s neighbors perceive the sanctity of life. A 1:1 ratio 
might help to refute such perceptions within Israeli society. 
Israel’s current policy of setting the conditions of release, 
such as the expulsion of released prisoners and demands for 
registration at police checkpoints, are also desirable from a 
violence-reduction perspective and are required to be further 
developed. However, even though desirable from a right-to-life 
point of view, such limitations might be in contrast with other 
protected rights and constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. 
B. HOW TO SOLVE THE LIVES-WEIGHING DILEMMA? 
It is clear that a fair and just answer to the question of 
weighing lives cannot be offered. Daniels and Sabin, both 
Harvard scholars, argue that in such cases the answer might be 
procedural: “When we lack consensus on principles that tell us 
what is fair . . . we may nevertheless find a process or procedure 
that most can accept as fair to those who are affected by such 
decisions. That fair process then determines for us what counts 
as a fair outcome.”163 Other Scholars, such as Rivka Weill, have 
similarly indicated that the best way to maintain and control 
prisoner exchange policies is by process-based limitations, 
rather than content-based limitations.164 
Daniels and Sabin refer to the allocation of healthcare 
funds, but their proposal could be adapted to any situation that 
involves the weighing of lives. Their doctrine, named 
“accountability for reasonableness,” includes four conditions to 
assure that such decisions are taken by a fair process: publicity 
condition, relevance condition, revision and appeals condition, 
and regulative condition.165 In short, they require that the 
process is transparent—the decisions and the grounds for 
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making them must be accessible to the public; the grounds for 
the decisions should be ones that fair-minded people would find 
relevant under the given constraints; the decision made must be 
subjected to revision and appeal; and finally there must be some 
form of regulation to ensure that the conditions are met.166 This 
Article adds the condition of equality, which may be read into 
the second condition (relevancy), but it needs to be stated clearly 
and separately. The policy of prisoner exchange must apply 
equally to all living captives. Weill has addressed the equality 
problem in prisoner exchange policy arguing that “[r]eacting on 
an ad hoc basis to terrorist kidnapping, as states currently do, 
invites biased decision-making. Knowing the identity of the 
victim and allowing society to develop empathies towards her 
affects the societal decision on how much to concede, if at all.”167 
For that matter, a captive soldier cannot have a “higher 
value” than a civilian with a mental illness (such as current 
living captives). All considerations and grounds for the decision 
should apply equally to all people in accordance to the equal 
moral worth of all human lives principle. 
It is important to note that it’s possible Israel follows some 
of the above recommendations, but in the absence of the 
publicity condition and a regulative framework for such decision, 
the current decision-making process remains unknown. 
However, it can be argued that a public protocol would harm the 
chances to strike a prisoner-exchange deal due to its sensitive 
nature and since it involves an element of national security. 
Such an argument cannot be valid though, due to its broad 
applications on Israeli citizens, and since such deal risks their 
lives. 
The implementation of the accountability for 
reasonableness framework to the prisoner-exchange decision-
making process can contribute towards greater fairness of the 
final decision made, but just as important is the sense of fair 
process in the public perception. As was described in Section II 
above, prisoner exchanges breach the right to accountability and 
remedy.168 Meanwhile, they interfere with the justice procedure 
and are foreign to the democratic principles of the rule of law. 
The accountability for reasonableness doctrine might help 
amend such holes in the public’s trust in the system, since the 
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decision-making process would be public, well-designed and 
have a legal base on which to rely. 
Another approach could be to let the public directly decide 
on the life-weighing issue. Referendums are one of the 
institutions of direct democracy that are said to express peoples’ 
will better than the institutions of representative democracy.169 
Such decisions made by the people might make the final decision 
appear more legitimate in the people’s eyes, and prevent the 
negative effects of breaching the accountability component of the 
right to life. That being said, referendums are not free of 
problems and flaws: they are susceptible to manipulation, they 
do not have to follow a formal process that includes debate and 
expert advice involving all voters, and are often set up in an all-
or-nothing, yes-or-no fashion, which thus fails to capture the 
complexities of the issue at hand.170 Even if one could find a 
creative manner to fit the subtleties of the prisoner-exchange 
decision into a referendum, it is not guaranteed that the result 
would benefit Israeli society. Referendums might cause tension 
and violence within society due to the explosive issues with 
which they concern.171 However, a prisoner-exchange 
referendum might overcome the manipulation obstacle. Since 
prisoner-exchange policy is not identified with a single party or 
political wing, and is extremely controversial within the 
different parties themselves, there is a chance that parties will 
not try to manipulate it since it holds an inherent political risk. 
Politicians might be pleased to be relieved of having to make an 
unpopular choice no matter what they choose. It is important to 
note that the outcome of undermining representatives’ 
accountability is often described as another negative effect of the 
referendum device.172 
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C. STRENGTHENING THE NORM AGAINST CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 
In light of the re-introduction of the discussion on capital 
punishment that prisoner exchange brings, it is important not 
only to reject such bills, but also to take action towards the 
abolition of capital punishment in Israel. Even though Israel has 
de facto abolished the death sentence it is still in the state’s book 
of laws. It is clear that once the death sentence has been 
abolished it cannot be re-introduced. The state of affairs, 
however, is not clear regarding de facto abolishers. State 
representatives should take responsibility and make it 
impossible to re-introduce such punishment in Israel. If such an 
amendment would be passed before the next exchange, it will 
block the populist argument in favor of “death to terrorists” from 
emerging again once an exchange is to be made. At the time of 
writing this study, negotiations are ongoing over a prisoner 
exchange, and therefore this matter is both crucial and topical. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lopsided prisoner-exchange deals have been struck down by 
the Israeli government since Israel’s early years. Recently, Israel 
has been at the center of public controversy, as criticism 
regarding the harmful effects of such policy has emerged.173 The 
Jewish tradition of captive redemption such as “Mitzvah Raba” 
alongside the ethos that soldiers are everyone’s children have 
motivated Israel to negotiate with captors, and to set an 
extremely high price tag on Israeli life. 
While Israel’s willingness to go to extreme lengths to save a 
single life shows great social solidarity and demonstrates the 
sanctity of life, it also feeds a cycle whereby more lives are lost. 
Such a high price tag on Israeli life encourages more 
kidnappings, which concludes in further prisoner exchanges, 
and so forth. It is also claimed that released prisoners are 
resuming their involvement in terrorism and causing further 
loss of lives.174 
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The negative effects of prisoner exchange has led to bills 
that aim to limit the scope of the exchange into a ratio of one 
prisoner in exchange for one captive. While those bills have been 
rejected, moderate restrictions have been placed on prisoner-
exchange policy by Government Law (Amendment No. 9) and 
Parole Law (Amendment No. 14). The prisoner-exchange policy 
does not only affect the right to life of those at risk by the 
released prisoners, it also harms the right to life in a broader 
sense. The accountability aspect is compromised when prisoners 
are released from prison in contradiction to the legal process and 
its outcomes, and resembles the grant of impunity. Prisoner 
exchange has also brought a new discussion on the death 
penalty, which has led to the “Death to Terrorists” bill, which 
was recently approved in the preliminary voting round. It is 
suggested that prisoner exchange has contributed to the 
weakening of the norm against the death punishment in Israel, 
alongside a weakening in the public’s trust towards the justice 
system and the state. In addition, the prisoner-exchange policy 
might be a cause for vigilantism in Israeli society and a 
perception that an attacker should be killed at the scene rather 
than be captured by law enforcement forces. 
When examining the prisoner-exchange policy with 
reference to the right to life, the analysis must consider the 
weight of identifiable lives versus that of statistical lives, which 
is a complicated situation that often involves many unknown 
factors. While the “rule of rescue” principle prefers the lives of 
identifiable people, it is now challenged by the principle of “equal 
moral worth of all human lives”, which claims that all else being 
equal, saving more lives rather than fewer is preferable as long 
as the beneficiaries are fairly chosen. While the above principles 
originally refer to healthcare policies, they can be adapted and 
applied to prisoner exchange policies as well. 
This Article has suggested a few modifications of Israel’s 
prisoner-exchange policy, in order to put it more in line with the 
right to life and to minimize some of its harmful consequences. 
Its suggestion includes the limitation of the scope of exchange to 
a 1:1 ratio of living captives only. As the life-weighing dilemma 
cannot have a single, just solution, a fair procedure must be 
adopted for the decision-making process. It has suggested the 
adoption of the “accountability for reasonableness” doctrine, 
with the addition of the equality condition in accordance to the 
“equal moral worth of all human lives” principle. This Article 
argues that Israel’s policy is lacking a public and transparent 
regulative framework for prisoner exchange, more than 
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anything else. 
Referendums are also a device that could be taken into 
consideration with regards to the prisoner-exchange issue. As 
prisoner-exchange decisions are often criticized as populist 
decisions of politicians caving into public pressure, a referendum 
would reflect the true will of the people rather than the people’s 
will translated by the media and social networks. It may 
contribute to a sense of accountability for the exchange by the 
people themselves, and subdue their feelings that the process is 
unjust and undemocratic, and rooted in breach of the 
accountability aspect of the right to life. 
Until such policy is adopted, and given the deterioration of 
the norm against the death penalty brought by the prisoner-
exchange issue, Israeli representatives must demonstrate 
responsibility and block any attempts of a re-introduction of 
capital punishment. Since international law is at the very least 
progressively abolitionist and does not allow for the re-
introduction of capital punishment, the best way to block such 
attempts would be to remove capital punishment from the 
Israeli law books once and for all. 
 
